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Introduction
There is an intrinsic relation between secrecy and security. Secrecy is both necessary and antithetical to security policies of democratic governance (Note, Harvard Law Review). It is necessary since fighting crime and international terrorism involves sensitive information in need of protection and subject to nondisclosure, which is instrumental to operations, yet antithetical because it keeps information away from the public eye and creates a gap in the civic discussion about most fundamental values in society (Chinen, 2008) . Secrecy guards national security by protecting information that would pose an identifiable threat to the security of nation by compromising its defence or the conduct of its foreign relations (Aftergood, 2009, p.402) . Further, secrecy is sometimes needed to preserve the element of surprise in government actions (Bok, 1986, p.176) . Instances of these justifications include the need for secrecy in the development or abandonment of plans and missions in wartime but also of law enforcement actions such as conducting an arrest. In this sense, there is tolerance for secrecy in a democracy when it protects various types of genuine national security information, from advanced military technologies to sensitive intelligence sources, from confidential diplomatic initiatives to fighting serious crime. When properly employed, secrecy serves the public interest (Aftergood, 2008, p.103 ). Yet, it seems that with many issues falling in national security, people "cannot evaluate some policies and processes because the act of evaluating defeats the policy or undermines the process" in question (Thompson, 1999, p.182) . In order to remedy this situation citizens must be able to know how secrecy is used in a democracy and who retains the power over it (Kitrosser, 2007) .
Classification of documents is the predominant manner in which secrecy appears in practice (Hall, 2005) . Technical at first sight, rules on classification actually mirror the structure of power and control within an organization (Curtin, 2003) . Classification of documents reflects a deliberate act to withhold information with the aim to protect it from unauthorized access. Therefore, blocking information and doing so intentionally is the starting point of secrecy. The classification system setts apart the secret keepers, those that classify and have access to classified information, and those outside the secret circle. Being a convenient tool by which the insiders can keep interference away from outsiders and if necessary hide embarrassment, secrecy through classification of documents is efficient for maintaining and enhancing power (Webber, 1946) . Furthermore, within the production of secrecy there is "always a problematic concern of participants because some are much more successful than others at practicing in it" (Bellman, 1981, p.1) .
How do these dynamics of secrecy materialize in the European Union (EU)? After decades in a culture of secrecy, ever since the Maastricht Treaty the European Union has made efforts to establish transparency as a fundamental principle of European governance (Birkinshaw, 2010) . Yet, at the same pace rules on classification of documents and other 'secrecy' measures are much more far reaching in terms of scope and width as the latest rules of the Council in March 2011 illustrate by incorporating all EU bodies in its "secrecy web" and applying to a broad spectrum of all its activities (Curtin, 2011 , Council Decision, 2011 . The mechanism of classification hides information away from the public eye and compiles a large body of secret information for reasons of, inter alia, public security and international relations. Of all refusals for access to documents, 95% fall under these two exceptions (Tenth annual report of the Council on the implementation of Regulation No.
1049/2001
). This effectively makes the classification system a trump card for keeping secrets in the EU in the name of security.
Thus, questions arise, who determines what becomes a secret and how it is kept?
Answering these questions is salient not merely for understanding the power structure behind the scene of secrecy but it is also telling on how actors in the EU manage their daily tasks while being under the general obligation of openness in the EU as stipulated by Article 10, Treaty on European Union. Additionally, the relation of secrecy and security brings the actors a situation of tension between protection of documents through classification on the one side and the need for operational flexibility where information can be easily exchanged on the other side. In achieving the right balance between these pulling forces, an EU actor must have sufficient power in deciding what gets classified, at which level and for how long. Moreover, in order to avoid information asymmetry and overclassification, an actor must be in charge for the major decisions involved in the classification process such as access, protection, and its exchange (Goitein, 2011 , Stiglitz, 1999 . With other words, both the democratic imperative and the operational flexibility require a balance between secrecy and openness as well as protection of information and successful application of security measures. Balancing here is understood not in a static and abstract sense but rather a practical plan for achieving these goals. Review of classification, for instance, is a concrete tool for realizing this dynamic balance and often the key to a successful system (Doyle, 1994) . This paper examines who retains the power over classification of documents by analyzing one specific EU actor: Europol. Namely, Europol is a law enforcement agency and important in security matters dealing with more than 10,000 cases a year in order to support Member States in enforcement operations (Europol, 2011) . In 2009 the Council adopted the Decision establishing Europol as an EU agency making management of information and its exchange Europol's raison d'être (Europol Decision, 2009) . Along with its establsihment, the Council provided Europol with the main tool for its work: the system of classification of information. Nowadays, Europol's activities in security expand from fight of serious crime, drug trafficking and terrorism to the more recent policies of cybercrime and cyber security (O'Neill, 2012, Argomaniz and Carrapico, 2012) . Apart from developing a prominent role in security substantively, Europol has also advanced in its manners of keeping secrets from a system characterized by an ad hoc approach to a sophisticated secrecy mechanism (Interview E1). But do these developments result in Europol having a dominant voice when it comes to classified information, and hence be held accountable for its decisions, or is Europol merely a "clearing house for information" facilitating "27 different cultures of secrecy with some Member States having a tendency to overclassify" (Groenleer, 2009 , Interview E4)?
The paper explores new ground by drawing on Europol's legal structure and enriching the discussion with empirical work through interviews with former and current practitioners. In doing so, the analytical framework of 'life-cycle information' is applied (Bruk, 1988 , DeSanti, 1993 , Hernon, 1994 . This framework offers a holistic perspective of classified information by examining information throughout a life span in which decisions must be made with respect to creation, management and final status. The life-cycle approach provides a meaningful insight in assessing the initial decision to classify throughout the period in which the information is of value (Moynihan, 1997) . Three particular elements -initiation of classification, access and exchange of classified information -of the lifecycle framework are discussed here in order to decipher who is the main actor for classification. These elements are the gist of the system, hence the decision-making power is mostly relevant at these stages.
In light of the aforementioned, the paper sets out the legislative matrix and the actors involved in classification (part two) and focuses on the commencement of classification by asking who actually makes the initial decision to classify a document (part three). The elaboration on the main actor is continued by zooming inside the secrecy game and asking who controls access and exchange of secrets (part four).
Against this background, review of classification is discussed in order to point out the implications of the current arrangements both for openness and security (part five).
Classification in Europol: what are the rules and who are the actors?
Emile Durkheim argued that removing something from the public review endows it with power and the object of secrecy -its information -is often less important than the organizational approach to managing it (Durkheim, 1915) . In that sense, the following section focuses on rules by which information is removed from public's eye and on the actors involved in this process.
Regulated secrecy
Regulated secrecy is composed of the norms and practices of classified information through which efforts are devoted to manage sensitive information. It is secrecy since the information is publically undisclosed and it is regulated considering it is arranged through decisions or other legal instruments. Europol, unlike many other international police cooperation networks or bodies, was not formed bottom-up by police professionals but is a result of a top-down decision by political and legislative bodies in the EU (Deflem, 2006) . Since the Amsterdam
Treaty there have been attempts to build a legal and institutional framework in order for Europol to be fully operational for fighting cross-border crime (Busuioc, 2011 Actor A's control over shared information is absolute. There are no norms or review mechanisms that oblige actor A to justify its decision to refuse a request for declassification or release of information which it has provided to actor B (Roberts, 2008) . In order to ensure the originator rule along with other security requisites, internally the security unit establishes the so-called security policies and security operating procedures. These procedures concern issues of classification such as the manners of distribution of classified information, its reproduction or its destruction.
Security operating procedures are thorough -they concern very technical matters related to physical protection of the information.
The regulation of secrecy, however, is merely an initial step to ensure functionality of the system. The actors involved are "the linchpin of classification" (Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 1997).
The Actors Involved: Classifiers
In general, there are two types of actors involved in the classification system: the ones that hold the initial classifying authority, and the rest that classify because they have in some way used information from a classified document (Quist, 2002 To start with, there is the Security Committee, in charge to set the broader policies, which is comprised of representatives from the Member States. To implement the policies set, coordinate and control all matters that fall within the security of classified information, one of the three deputy directors that assist the Director of Europol is assigned. This official, called the Security Coordinator, monitors the enforcement of security provisions and makes sure that no breaches occur.
The day-to-day work within Europol is done by the security officers who are assigned specific tasks to instruct, assist and advise all persons at Europol regarding security of classified documents. "Confidentiality desk official" is the official job title of classified information experts who deal with facilitating the access, production, reproduction and other matters concerning classified information in Europol classified information when it comes to its protection, level of classification, access to information and so on. In cases where the Member States, for example, share information with Europol, upon receiving that information a head of Unit is assigned as the owner of the information for the purposes of Europol. What this implies is that the person designated as the owner has the overall responsibility over that information within Europol's operation. Thus, the originator is the Member State that is sending that information and they retain all the privileges that come from having such a position due to the originator principle. In the case where Europol is producing information that is classified then it is the person issuing that document that is both the originator and the owner of the information within Europol.
In sum, Europol's classification system is regulated mainly by the Council although specific and technical matters are managed by its security unit. More importantly,
Europol to a large extent is a derivative classifier. This implies that most of the fundamental decisions regarding secrecy are not made by Europol. The following sections will discuss if indeed that is the case.
The main decision-maker in the initiation of the classification process
The initial classification determination, establishing what should not be disclosed and the level of protection required, is probably the most important single factor in the security of all classified programs (Thompson, 1969) . None of the expensive personnel-clearance and information-control provisions (physical security aspects) of an information security system come into effect until information has been classified.
The first decision is the pivot on which the whole subsequent security system turns (Moynihan, 1997) . Therefore, it is important to classify only information that truly warrants protection in the interest of security. However, the task of deciding which information is to be classified, at which level, and for how long remains in large part a subjective judgment open to a range of interpretation. Officials admit that there is no such thing as a mathematical formula which gives all the answers. Consequently, the individuals who classify information should be made aware about the implications of their decisions (Interview E4).
There are three main and most important decisions at the very outset of classifying:
first, determining whether a document should be classified; second, establishing its classification level; and third, indicating its duration of classification. Thus, the first stage of classification identifies the information that must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Security measures thereafter determine how to protect information which has been classified (Church, 1966) .
At the start of the classification process, i.e. making decisions if information should be classified, the position of an original classifier and derivative classifier does not differ much. The derivative classifier also makes a similar decision with respect to documents by asking whether the document should be classified because of the information it contains or reveals. What is meant here is that the base of a document being a classified document in itself does not require absolutely that the other document is also classified. Rather, if the information from the classified document is contained in the newly made document then the deriving document is classified at the same level as the original one. Mention here should immediately be made to the concept of "born classified" (Green, 1981) . This concept assumes that newly discovered information might be so significant with respect to security that it requires immediate and absolute control. The main characteristic of this concept is that positive action is not required to put information in this category because if information falls within the definition of the legal act it is in this category from the moment of its origination (hence the name "born classified"). A unique example of this concept is to be found in the USA, The Atomic Energy Act of 1945 where there is an assumption that the newly discovered atomic-energy information is important for security reasons and it requires instant and utter control (Hewlett, 1982 , Quist, 2002 ).
This concept is not known in Europol.
In Europol's practice, but also more generally, the life of a classified document starts at the early stages of drafting. As a practitioner explains (Interview E1):
"Who makes the decision most of the time? The drafter. He has a certain view and expertise on the subject matter, a certain understanding or interpretation of the rule, he may want to use classification to give importance to his work, may need to respect the confidentiality level of the information he used, or following his national background, classifies certain issues a certain way -or classifies everything. Classification is subjective -it is a judgment call."
However, most of the time the drafting process actually starts at the national level.
Europol is wholly reliant on information received from Member States (Brady, 2008) .
Member States' position in regard to the initial step of classification matters particularly in two instances. Firstly, when the Member State supply already classified information to Europol they are responsible for the choice if the information should have been classified, at which level and for how long. A classification level indicates the relative importance of classified information to security and thereby determines the specific security requirements applicable to that information. Clearly defined classification levels are essential to an effective classification system. The appropriate classification level would be expected to usually be determined by the information disclosure risks because those risks largely determine the magnitude of the harm that could be caused by such disclosure (Quist, 2002 (Busuioc, 2011) .
Operational flexibility is very important for Europol to deliver successful results and it is conditioned by having information which is protected at the appropriate level (Interview E3). If the level of classification is higher than restricted for Europol it creates not merely a more burdensome administrative procedure but also goes against the logic of being operational and finalizing the case in national courts where adjudications require information to be shared with the defendant or the general public. In case Europol comes to the conclusion that the choice of a classification level needs changing (for instance removing or adding a classification level, or adding a classification level to a document previously subject to the basic protection level), it cannot undertake any action without a prior agreement of the Member State providing the information. Although Europol itself might be "reasonable" when it comes to the level of classification, due to "27 different approaches from the Member
States" with some having a tendency to over classify, it ends up being bound by the culture of classification of the Member States (Interview E4).
It is not merely the level of classification that can be disputed there might be a similar case with its duration. Classification duration may be defined (1) in terms of a time period measured from the origination date of a document (i.e., at a future date) or (2) in terms of a future event which must occur prior to declassification. Therefore, for classification decisions, the question is whether duration of classification can be specified for classified information or whether no duration can be specified so that declassification must await the actual disclosure event. In practice, Europol officials acknowledge that they need operational flexibility and that they are bound by the 
Dynamics inside the secrecy game
The classification system ensures that access and exchange of information is only granted to authorized individuals. Consequently, all the mechanisms build in the system are focused at these two key points. Who allows access and/or exchange of classified information in Europol?
Controlling Access to Secrets
The most important aim of protecting documents is to avoid unauthorized access.
Hence, within the classification system access is considered as a central element for protecting sensitive information. Apart from the positive effect of protecting information, access can also be a tool to determine who is part of the "insiders club of information" and who is not. Echoing Bok, secrecy presupposes separation, a setting apart of keepers of a secret from those excluded (Bok, 1986) . Hence, determining who has access is a practical reflection of the authority to determine the insiders and outsiders of secrecy. Within the system of classifying information there are two principles, usually in interaction, which determine access to classified information:
the need-to-know principle and the level of classification of the information. The need-to-know principle is one of the conditions that the individuals within the organization need to fulfil in order to gain access to the classified information. As the wording implies, access is granted if there is a need, either due to obligations or position, for the individual to acquire that information. Additionally, the level of classification determines who would access the information considering that higher levels of classification are reserved for higher level of officials within the administration. These two aspects of the classification system provide a useful kit when it comes to ensuring the security and protection of the information, however at the same time they also enable that the information is compartmentalized. Such phenomenon impacts the decision-making process both in terms of efficiency and creating a cluster of inside-insiders, i.e. only a limited number of individuals knowing the classified information. In this light, firstly, secrecy provides the opportunity for special interest to have a greater sway (Stiglitz, 1999) ; secondly, it creates a situation where decisions are made with imperfect information and may lead to not achieving optimal results that might have occurred if more had been known (Scheppele, 1988) . Apart from the need-to-know principle, security clearance is also necessary in order to gain access to classified information. Security clearance implies that a vetting procedure takes place in order to determine the loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability of a person concerned.
In sum, in order to access information, an official must have a security clearance and a need-to-know for the information. In Europol, these conditions are governed by
Member States' consent, decision, and action. Namely, where Europol intends to entrust persons with a sensitive activity, at the request of the Director of Europol, Member States have the responsibility to arrange the security screening of their nationals. This is done in accordance with the national provisions and the results are binding on Europol. There is also an obligation to provide assistance to each other with the security screening considering particularly that only persons that have undergone the special training and screening are allowed access to classified information. Hence, all persons who have access to information subject to a classification level must have a security clearance which is issued by the Member State. They might have different principles but "everyone has the same minimum standards" (Interview E4). There are some states that have more rigid procedures, for example they check more personal data for the individual concerned for a longer period of time or have a lie-detector which might not be allowed in other countries.
Nevertheless, the procedure of security clearance is under the authority of the Member States.
Not all Member States have the same speed of issuing the security clearance and in order to remedy a situation where an individual starts working in Europol but lacks a security clearance to actually access information, a temporary security clearance is issued (Interview E2). The temporary authorization can last up to a maximum of six months, however information granted under this authorization cannot be at the security level of "SECRET EU/ EU SECRET" or beyond. Thus, it is a mechanism to enable persons to get acquainted with the classified information in order to fulfill their obligations. However, since the security clearance is not yet granted there are three cumulative conditions under which this authorization may be given: first, it is in the interest of Europol for the person to know the information; second, the national authorities have been given a notification; third, the national authorities have no reaction within three months. After the authorization is given, the security coordinator informs the national authorities. Lastly, when a Member State provides information to Europol it can specify that the temporary authorization cannot be exercised in relation to that information. When it comes to persons cleared at national level, it is the security coordinator who grants authorization for access. Again, the principle of need-to-know on the basis of the duty or obligation is applicable. This authorization, however, is subject to regular review by the security coordinator and can be withdrawn on justifiable grounds. Security screening is subject to annual check for which the Director prepares a Report submitted to the Management Board.
Granting a security clearance for a certain level of classified information is not supposed to mean that an individual gains access to all information classified at that level. The dissemination of classified information is intended to be limited to those who both (1) hold the appropriate clearance, and (2) need the information in order to properly perform their duties.
While the security clearance can be seen as something more permanent, subject to reviews at times, the need-to-know condition is dynamic in the sense that it can differ depending on official's position and specific subject of work. Within Europol, it is the owner of the information that decides who has a need to be acquainted with the information. there is a need to know -so you have need to know and nice to know. It is only if you have need to know that you access it" (Interview E3).
The Member States can be explicit about who can get access to their information within Europol and beyond through the so-called "handling codes". Namely, a handling code (as the name suggests) determines how the information will be dealt with in judicial proceedings and how it will be shared with the rest of Member States.
There is an imperative that the information must be handled in accordance with the wishes of its originator. There are different handling codes as a practitioner explains (Interview E3):
"What we have at Europol is handling codes H1, H2, H3, so every time a
Member State sends information to us -if they put H1 on it means this can be shared with all Member States, unless they want to use in in judicial proceedings we have to ask our adviser our authorization again.
H2 means that in principle means that it cannot disseminated with anyone -you send it to Europol but you cannot send it to any other Member State. So every time Germany sends us something with H2 and we think to share it with Finland we go back to the Germans asking if they agree that we also share with Finland and they decide. H3 basically means any other restriction -so if the Member States wants the document is accessed only by a certain group of people or even certain individuals they will have to put it as H3 saying this can only be seen by the director and work file X."
The elaboration thus far implies rigidity of the system which is correct when it comes to information classified from Confidential and higher. But, every individual at Europol, almost except for some contractors or legal inters, has access to restricted information which is also the highest number of information (Interview E2). That makes 800 people (Interview E1, E4, Europol official web page). This number is impressive especially considering that restricted information can contain very sensitive issues among which operational plans for EU police investigations or updates on security risks at foreign embassies, to name but a few examples.
Against this background, the question arises, if access to secrecy is provided for so many individuals, how is exchange of secrecy organized?
Secret sharing
Exchange of information is the core of Europol's activities. This implies that the system is comprehensive and complex. Europol exchanges information with the Member States, the European Union bodies and third parties. Out of these three relations, the exchange with the Member States is most developed and important.
Notably, Europol exists in order to facilitate the Member States' direct fight against crime (Bruggeman, 2007) . Nevertheless, the relation with EU bodies and third parties is also relevant especially since Europol aims to have a broad and coordinated approach to information coming from all parts of the world in order to provide reliable reports on threats assessments.
In order to capture the main decision maker when it comes to exchange of information, this section analysis Europol's exchange of information firstly with the Member States, secondly with a EU body, and lastly with a third party. This provides a full picture for different instances where Europol appears as an information broker. "We were astonished to read in the Home Office written evidence …that "the vast majority of information exchanges between liaison bureaux occurs outside the formal systems, and thus while providing very significant benefit to the participating countries the main loser is Europol, which is denied the opportunity to access the information. It is reported that up to 80% of bilateral engagement occurs this way…"
Sharing with Member States
Europol's added value lays in its analysis and report which are a result of assembling classified information from the various sources they receive. If an analysis is of a general nature and of a strategic type, the report is shared with all Member States.
But if an analysis bears on specific cases not concerning all Member States and has a direct operational aim, the only Member States that can access the report are those that provided the initial information leading to the opening of the file, those which are directly concerned by that information, and others that these Member States 1 Article 10, 11, 12 13, Europol Confidentiality Decision might invite to participate. Other states may learn about the existence of the analysis file through a computerized index and may request to be involved in the exchange but the originator State may object, hence prevent, others to have the information.
As in other matters, exchange of information is dominated by one particular theme that of the originator rule. This seen in combination with the fact that the Member
States are the biggest provider of information means that both directly and indirectly they dominate. Yet, some Member States still do not give Europol sufficient or consistent support (Brady, 2008) . Some have explained this phenomenon in terms that sharing information, albeit the core of Europol's work, is problematic because "the national agencies fear that sensitive information might be leaked" (Wille, 2008, p.57) . Europol remains "an intergovernmental dish with some communitarian sauce" where Member States may or may not share information. And if they do share, they do it on their own terms.
Sharing within
The Council has established a particular decision that deals with which third parties Understanding (Serzysko, 2011) .
Sharing with the outside
The other two sources of information exchange are third states and international organisations. In the past years there has been an increase of information exchange which occurred through the Secure Information Exchange Network Application. Yet, which allows the USA law enforcement authorities and Europol to share both strategic information (threat tips, crime patterns, and risk assessments) as well as personal information (such as names, addresses, and criminal records). Europol and the USA aim to implement common standards on clearances and to develop adequate measures for the exchange of classified information. Best practices are shared already and exchange programmes for analysts take place on a regular basis in strategic and joint operational actions (Archick, 2012) .
However, the relation with this partner is not always affable. Despite growing USA-EU ties and agreements in the law enforcement area, some USA critics continue to doubt the utility of collaborating with EU-wide bodies given good existing bilateral relations between the FBI and CIA (among other agencies) and national police and intelligence services in EU member states. Many note that Europol lacks enforcement capabilities, and that its effectiveness to assess and analyse terrorist threats and other criminal activity largely depends on the willingness of national services to provide it with information. Meanwhile, European officials complain that the United States expects intelligence from others, but does not readily share its own (Archick, 2012) .
The overview of exchange of information leads to three particular conclusions.
Firstly, Europol is dependent on Member States' will to provide it with information and Europol is obliged by that will when it shares information with other partners.
Secondly, Europol's cooperation within the EU legal contours is determined by primary law and the presence of Member States in this type of exchange is manifested through the originator principle. Thirdly, Europol has established many contractual relations with third parties. Yet, some of them including key security players prefer to share classified information with the Member States directly bypassing the sophisticated secrecy mechanism of Europol.
What are the implications?
It has been noted on several occasions that national investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial authorities remain the key actors in European law enforcement (Busuioc, 2011) and that Europol is still not playing a central role in European police cooperation (Report House of Lords, 2005 . Perhaps this should not be very surprising considering that by law Europol's mandate is to support Member States (Europol Decision, 2009) . Some see this as "design flaw" considering that no real responsibilities are transferred (Wille, 2008) . But the concern for the present purposes Although throughout the 1980s the idea of a European-style FBI was put forward (Bunyan, 1995) , Europol has always performed facilitator-like functions and not executive competency (Bruggeman, 2007) . De facto Europol could have increased its role to a more autonomous agency especially after its entitlement to ask Member
States to start an investigation, yet it has remained limited. Some have explained this limitation by the lack of trust of Member States towards Europol (Walsh, 2006 , Kaunert, 2010 . A further explanation based on mistrust suggests that national agencies that do not have reservations about sharing information with Europol, remain cautious because of the effect this may have on their "well-established and successful bi-lateral relationship with other, more apprehensive states, most notably, but not only, the USA" (Cross, 2011 , Walsh, 2006 . Others insist, in general, those who are responsible for maintenance of security systems do not need to know anything about the secrets they protect (Coser, 1963 , Lowry, 1972 hence their autonomy is irrelevant in order to safeguard security. In sum, the general literature on EU intelligence tends to focus on the normative (trust) or functional (efficiency) incentives member states need to have toward cooperation (Cross, 2011) .
Europol seems to be of the idea that trust comes first and foremost, especially considering that there is no legal obligation for the Member States to provide it with
information. An experienced official explains (Interview E2):
"We need to maintain high level of trust… that we can actually protect their information. We can deal with it in the way they want us to. If we start making some sorts of decisions on our own or play any kind of game with the information that we receive of course there is the danger always that they will just stop giving us the information because there is no legal obligation for the member states to actually provide us with the information it is up to them what they provide to us… if they just decide that [we] are not trustworthy enough to actually release the information then they can just use the system of the liaison bureau to work again on a bilateral bases. We can just be not in the picture."
The Member States play a double role in the classification system of Europol. One the one hand, they provide most of the information which Europol analysis. On the other hand, they are the receiver of the end product -the reports encompassing classified information from all the Member States and other parties Europol works with. This duality creates a situation for Europol that if the first part of the cycle is not successful it directly impacts the second part and decreases value in Europol's work.
To summarize, Europol is a facilitator of the Member States, it is dependent on the information received from them, the manner in which Europol handles that information has a direct impact on how much value Europol can add to the entire and Article 10 TEU ensuring that every citizen has a right to participate in the democratic life of "as openly as possible" Union. Secondly, the objective of Europol is to maintain operational flexibility which means that informed decisions are taken for investigations, information is exchanged in a secure yet expeditious fashion and lastly information can be used in judicial proceedings.
Both perspectives, openness and operational flexibility, can be concretely elaborated through the mechanism of review. A review of the classification system seeks to promote both the effective protection of information where warranted and the disclosure of information where there is not a well-founded basis for protection.
Namely, a review of the classification system implies a check of the system. The review of classification system is a crucial instrument to ensure the security of the system but also check that there is no overclassification or compartmentalization of information making it a valuable tool through which accountability of actions is ensured. A review serves the purpose to make proposals for reform in order to reduce the volume of information classified and thereby to strengthen the protection of legitimately classified information, as well as to improve existing personnel security procedures (Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 1997).
The review can be internally organized such as for security reasons done by the security unit within Europol or it can be an external check for reasons of compliance and accountability. When it comes to personal data, Europol is reviewed by the Europol Joint Supervisory Body which is an independent body and ensures compliance with the data protection regime.
A review of the classification system in Europol happens only internally through the Security unit (Interview E4). Although legally, the Europol Confidentiality Decision stipulates that review may be conducted by the Council, this has not been the case (Interview E1, E2, E4). The Security unit however does not conduct a review on a "structural basis if there is over or under classification" (Interview E4). They see themselves as "custodian of the information" but not on every individual level.
There is an annual revision for the higher classified information, i.e. classified as restricted and above. The Security unit also conducts a review every 5 years, usually to determine if documents should be declassified. This type of review is steered towards improving the protection of classified information and the originators are consulted. It serves, therefore, more towards the direction to enhance operational flexibility.
A democratic review by the European Parliament is not present. This is due to the current competences of the EP in regards to Europol as a result of pre-Lisbon Europol Decision by the Council. Namely, the EP has no authority to check directly Europol for the classification system. The Europol Director is obliged to appear before the EP but questions regarding the classification system cannot be raised with great success considering that the EP has no direct access to classified information.
The only mechanism available for the EP which can have drastic consequences is the adoption of the budget. 'The threat to refuse or delay the discharge of a budget can be used as a tool to request chances to a policy, procedures, or activities'
(Parliamentary Oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European Union, 2011). As strong as this tool is, nevertheless, it does not tackle the issues of classification as such and in a sense does not create positive effects since the EP cannot recommend changes of the classification per se. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that only due to classification issues the EP would not approve the budget of
Europol.
Yet discussing review seems premature considering that the EP does not even have access to classified information and Europol treats it as a general public. This is a 
Conclusions
Protecting and exchanging sensitive information is crucial for security in the European Union where there are multiple actors engaged in a common goal of 'a secure Europe in a better world'. Europol, a law enforcement agency, stands as a broker in the midst of the exchange of classified information both within the EU and towards the outside. Yet, Europol has little decision-making power when it comes to choosing information to be classified, the level of classification or its duration.
Moreover, Europol to a large extent merely facilitates the process of access and exchange of classified information. Member States, the original classifier in 95% of the overall classified documents, condition Europol's work by their consent, decision, and action. Irrespective of the normative issues such as trust or efficiency matters that lead to the disproportion between Europol's activities and its full power over them, this situation has created space for Europol to have a sophisticated secrecy mechanism without holding complete accountability over it. This is particularly evident when two key imperatives for Europol's undertakings -the principle of openness and operational flexibility -are judged against the mechanism of review of the classification system.
The current state of affairs leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, the Member States, at times reluctantly share their secrets with Europol but at all times maintain the final authority over them. This leads to the second conclusion, namely, Europol has a sophisticated system of secrecy in order to facilitate the security needs of the Member
States, hence the EU as well, which takes place without serious review be that for the constitutional requirement of openness or for security necessity of operational flexibility. Hence, the classification system in Europol requires consideration for serious and fundamental reforms in the upcoming changes of Europol's legal status to be adopted by EU's legislator.
